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We show how to transform any interactive proof system which is
statistical zero-knowledgewith respect to the honest-veriﬁer,into a
proofsystemwhichisstatisticalzero-knowledgewithrespecttoany
veriﬁer. This is done by limiting the behavior of potentially cheat-
ing veriﬁers, without using computational assumptions or even re-
ferringtothecomplexityof suchveriﬁerstrategies. (Previoustrans-
formationshaveeitherreliedoncomputationalassumptionsorwere
applicable only to constant-round public-coin proof systems.)
Ourtransformationalsoappliestopublic-coin(akaArthur-Merlin)
computational zero-knowledge proofs: We transform any Arthur-
Merlin proof system which is computational zero-knowledge with
respect to the honest-veriﬁer, into an Arthur-Merlin proof system
which is computationalzero-knowledgewith respect to any proba-
bilistic polynomial-time veriﬁer.
A crucial ingredient in our analysis is a new lemma regarding
2-universal hashingfunctions.
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Zero-Knowledgeproofs,introducedbyGoldwasser,MicaliandRack-
off[GMR89], arefascinatingandextremelyusefulconstructs. Their
fascinating nature is due to their seemingly contradictory nature;
they are both convincing and yet yield nothing beyond the valid-
ity of the assertion being proven. Their applicability in the domain
of cryptography is vast; they are typically used to force malicious
parties to behaveaccording to a predetermined protocol (which re-
quires parties to provide proofs of the correctness of their secret-
based actions without revealing these secrets).
Zero-knowledge proofs come in many ﬂavors. Arguably, the
mostimportantparametersrefertothestrengthofthezero-knowledge
(or simulability) condition. These are captured by two parameters:
The ﬁrst parameter is the type of adversary which is supposed to
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learn nothing while verifying an assertion. The simplest type is a
honest-veriﬁer;thatis, onewhichfollows theprotocol (andendsup
with thetranscript of theinteraction). Zero-knowledgewith respect
to an honest-veriﬁer is already a fascinating notion from a concep-
tualaswellasacomplexity-theoreticpointofview. However,cryp-
tographicapplicationstypicallyrequire robustnessagainstarbitrary
(or arbitrary feasible) behavior which typically deviates from the
protocol. Thisisthegeneral(orstandard)notionofzero-knowledge.
A major open problem in the area is whether honest-veriﬁer zero-
knowledge equals general zero-knowledge. A positive answer to
this question may also lead the way to a useful methodology: First
construct a honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge proof to the problem at
hand, and next transform it to a general zero-knowledge proof. To
describe our contribution to the above open problem, we need ﬁrst
to discussa secondmajor parameter of the zero-knowledgeframe-
work – the notion of learning nothing.
The requirement that the veriﬁer learns nothing from the proof
is formulated bysayingthat the transcript of its interaction with the
prover can be simulated by the veriﬁer itself. That is, there exists
anefﬁcientprocedurethanoninputavalidassertionproducesadis-
tribution which is “similar” to the distribution of transcripts of the
executions of the proof system on that assertion. The key param-
eter is the interpretation of “similarity”. Three notions have been
commonly consideredin the literature (cf., [GMR89, For89]). Per-
fect Zero-Knowledge (PZK) requires that the two distributions be
identical. StatisticalZero-Knowledge(SZK) requiresthatthesedis-
tributions be statistically close (i.e., the variation distance between
themisnegligible). Finally,ComputationalZero-Knowledge(CZK)
refers to the casethat these distributions are computationallyindis-
tinguishable (cf., [GM84, Yao82]).
Assumingtheexistenceofone-wayfunctions,anylanguagewhich
hasaninteractiveproof, hasalsoaComputationalZero-Knowledge
one(cf., [GMW91,IY87,BGG
 88]). Thus,assumingtheexistence
ofone-wayfunctions,theaboveproblem(i.e., ofhonest-veriﬁerZK
versus general ZK) is long resolved for the case of Computational
Zero-Knowledge. Still, itisopenwhetheronecanprovethathonest-
veriﬁer CZK equals general CZK, without assuming the existence
of one-way functions. We resolve this problem for the special case
of public-coin (aka Arthur-Merlin) proof systems–
Theorem 1 Every language having an Honest-Veriﬁer Computa-
tionalZero-Knowledgepublic-coinproofsystem,alsohasageneral
Computational Zero-Knowledge(public-coin) proof system.
We note that it is known that the existence of honest-veriﬁer CZK
for languagesoutsideBPPyieldsaweakform ofone-wayfunctions
[OW93]. However,this weakform of one-wayfunctions does NOT
seem to sufﬁce for constructing general CZK proofs for the same
language(in general).Themainfocusofthispaperisthehonest-veriﬁerversusgeneral
veriﬁer problem for Statistical Zero-Knowledge. We fully resolve
the problem in this case–
Theorem 2 Every language having an Honest-Veriﬁer Statistical
Zero-Knowledgeproofsystem,alsohasageneral(public-coin)Sta-
tistical Zero-Knowledgeproof.
Resultsofsimilarnaturewerepreviouslyachievedunderintractabil-
ity assumptions(cf., [BMO90, OVY93, Oka96]). A weakeruncon-
ditional result was claimed in [DOY97]. All these are discussedin
detail below. But ﬁrst we need to be somewhat more precise about
the notions and issuesdiscussedabove.
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Thebasicnotionsofinteractiveproofs[GMR89] arerecalledinAp-
pendix A. Throughout this subsection we ﬁx a language
L, and an
interactiveproofsystem,
 
P
 
V
 ,forit.
  Thebasicparadigmofzero-
knowledge is that for every veriﬁer of a certain class, there should
be anefﬁcient non-interactive machine,called the simulator, which
is ableto “simulatewell”the viewof the veriﬁerin real interactions
with the prescribed prover (i.e.,
P). The two main issues we con-
siderare (1) whichveriﬁersshouldbesimulated, and(2) the quality
of simulation.
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  Thetwo standardclassesarethe
classconsistingmerelyof theprescribedveriﬁer
V (akathehonest-
veriﬁer), and the class consisting of all probabilistic polynomial-
time interactive machines (i.e., feasible cheating strategies for the
veriﬁer).
Forthecaseofstatisticalzero-knowledge,wewillconsidereven
a wider (in fact the widest possible) class – the class of all possi-
ble veriﬁer strategies (including non-computable ones). This will
make our result even stronger. But how can an efﬁcient machine
(i.e., the simulator) simulate the behavior (let alone interaction) of
a non-computable veriﬁer strategy? The clue is the familiar notion
of a reduction, capturedin this contextby the notion of a black-box
simulator. The latter is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle ma-
chinewhichisgivenoracleaccesstotheveriﬁerstrategy.
  Wecom-
ment that thenotionof black-boxsimulationwasconsideredbefore
for other reasons (cf., [GO94, GK96]).
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  When
deﬁning statistical zero-knowledge(w.r.t. a class of veriﬁers), one
requires that for every veriﬁer,
V
 , in the class there exists an efﬁ-
cientsimulator,
S
 , suchthatthe following two distribution ensem-
bles are statistically close (i.e., the variation distance is eventually
smaller than
 
 
p
 
j
x
j
  for every positive polynomial
p):
1.
f
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V
 
 
 
x
 
 
x
 
L
g, where
 
P
 
V
 
 
 
x
  denotes the view
of
V
  when interacting with
P on common input
x. Recall
thatthis viewconsistsof
x, all internal cointossesof
V
 , and
all messagesreceived from
P.
2.
f
S
 
 
x
 
 
x
 
L
g.
The variation distance between the two distribution ensembles is
calledthesimulatordeviation. Incasethereexistsablack-boxsim-
ulator, denoted
S, the second distribution ensemble is
f
S
V
 
 
x
 
 
1 All our results extend also to promise problems.
2 That is, assuming deterministic strategies, each query is parsed as a sequence of
provermessagesrepresentingapreﬁxof theinteraction,andtheanswer isthe response
of this veriﬁer strategy to such a preﬁx. Probabilistic veriﬁer strategies are considered
by ﬁrst randomlyselecting and ﬁxing a deterministic strategy, and then proceedingas
above.
x
 
L
g, where
S
V
 
 
x
  denotes the output distribution of
S on in-
put
x and oracle accessto
V
 .
When deﬁning computational zero-knowledge(with respect to
a class of veriﬁers), one instead requires that the two distributions
aboveare computationally indistinguishable(cf., [GM84, Yao82]).
That is, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm,
D, the
followingquantityisnegligible(i.e., iseventuallysmallerthan
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In our deﬁnitions of zero-knowledge, we require that the simu-
lators run in strict polynomial-time, as in [Gol95].
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H
V
S
Z
K (resp.,
S
Z
K) denote the class of lan-
guageshavinginteractiveproofswhicharestatisticalzero-knowledge
with respectto the honest-veriﬁer(resp., with respect to any proba-
bilistic polynomial-time veriﬁer). The classes
H
V
C
Z
K and
C
Z
K
are deﬁnedanalogouslyfor computational zero-knowledge.
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
o
i
n
 
o
r
A
r
t
h
u
r
 
M
e
r
l
i
n
 
p
r
o
o
f
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
  As we re-
fer to this notion, let us recall that public-coin proofsystemsare in-
teractive proof systems in which the prescribed veriﬁer’s strategy
amounts to the following: In each round, the veriﬁer tosses a pre-
determined number of coins and sends the outcome to the prover,
and at the end it decides whether to accept by applying a predicate
to the(full) sequenceofmessagesit hassentandreceived. For each
oftheclasses
C above,wedenoteby
C
j
a
m thesubclassofpubliccoin
(or Arthur-Merlin) proof systems having the corresponding zero-
knowledgeproperty.
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The situation with respect to computational ZK is as follows.
Positive for CZK: Assuming the existence of one-way functions,
C
Z
K
j
a
m
 
I
P (cf., [GMW91,IY87,BGG
 88,HILL,Nao91]),
and so under this assumption the status of all computational
zero-knowledgeclasses is resolved.
“Negative” for CZK: If one-wayfunctions do not exist then only
“easy on the average languages” have honest-veriﬁer (com-
putational) zero-knowledge proofs [OW93]. This result al-
most complementsthe positive result above.
Open for CZK: Does
H
V
C
Z
K
 
C
Z
K hold unconditionally?
(Or put otherwise, can it be provenwithout assumingthe ex-
istence of one-way functions?)
Recall, this paper resolvesthis openproblem for the caseof public-
coin proof systems; that is, we show that
H
V
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Z
K
j
a
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C
Z
K
j
a
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As for statistical ZK we have
Positive for SZK: Severalcomputationalproblems,believedtobe
hard, areknowntohavestatisticalzero-knowledgeproofsys-
tems; for example, Quadratic Residuosity [GMR89], Graph
Isomorphism[GMW91], aproblemequivalenttotheDiscrete
Logarithm Problem [GK93], Statistical Difference [SV97],
and a gap promise problem for lattices [GG98].
Negative for SZK:
H
V
S
Z
K
 
A
M
 
c
o
A
M [For89, AH87].Inside HVSZK: A key result regarding SZK is that any honest-
veriﬁer statistical zero-knowledge proof can be transformed
intooneusingonlypublic-coins[Oka96]. Thatis,
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K is closedunder
complement [Oka96, SV97].
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Recall,thispaperresolvesthisopenproblem,showingthat
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  Theproblemofrelating
H
V
S
Z
K
to
S
Z
K was ﬁrst studied in [BMO90]. They showed that the two
classes coincide, provided that the Discrete Logarithm Problem is
hard. At the time, it seemed puzzling that computational assump-
tions canbe usedin the supposedly“information theoretic”context
of statistical zero-knowledge. However, a careful examination re-
veals that the standardclass
S
Z
K doesrefer to computationallim-
itations: It is requiredto simulate onlyall probabilistic polynomial-
time veriﬁers. Thecomputationalassumptionisthususedtorestrict
the behavior of cheating veriﬁers. This approach was carried to its
climax in [Oka96] (cf., [DGOW95, Part 2]): Using any bit com-
mitment scheme (and thus any one-way function [HILL, Nao91])
it was shown that
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tence of one-wayfunctions implies
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  The only un-
conditionaltransformationsofhonest-veriﬁerSZK(resp.,CZK)known
before,referredtotheclassofconstant-roundpublic-coinproofsys-
tems (cf., [Dam94, DGW94]). It wasshownthat if
L hasa HVSZK
(resp., HVCZK) public-coin proof system of a constant number of
rounds then
L
 
S
Z
K
j
a
m (resp.,
L
 
C
Z
K
j
a
m).
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  In[DOY97]itisclaimedthatanylanguagein
H
V
S
Z
K
has an interactive proof,
 
P
 
V
 , with the following non-standard
statistical zero-knowledgeproperty: For everypositive polynomial
p, andevery probabilistic polynomial-time veriﬁer
V
 , there exists
aprobabilisticpolynomial-timesimulator
S
 
p (withrunning-timede-
pendingon
p) so that the variation distancebetweentheprobability
ensembles,
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We obtain the ﬁrst unconditional general transformation of honest-
veriﬁer zero-knowledgeto general zero-knowledge.
Theorem 3 (main result): There exists an efﬁcient transformation
ofHonest-VeriﬁerStatistical(resp.,Computational)Zero-Knowledge
public-coin proofsystems,into generalStatistical (resp., Computa-
tional) Zero-Knowledgepublic-coin proof systems. Furthermore,
1. The resulting proof systems has twice as many roundsas the
original one.
2. The resulting prover strategy can be implemented in proba-
bilistic polynomail-time given oracle access to the original
proverstrategy.
3. Thecompletenesserrorof the resultingproofsystemis expo-
nentiallyvanishing. Incasetheoriginalproofsystemhasper-
fect completeness,so does the resulting one.
3The ﬁrst authorwasunableto verifythe claimsandargumentsgivenin [DOY97].
4. The soundnesserrorof the resultingproofsystemis bounded
aboveby
 
 
p
 
j
x
j
 , where
p is anarbitrarypolynomialdeter-
mined by the transformation.
5. The resulting proof system has a black-box zero-knowledge
simulator.
6. IncaseofStatisticalZero-Knowledge,theresultingsimulator
is strong(i.e., it canhandlearbitraryveriﬁerstrategies),and
its simulation error is at most
p
o
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y
 
j
x
j
 
 
 
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
x
j
 ,
where
 
 
x
  is the simulation errorof the original system.
Theorems1and2follow,whereincaseofStatisticalZero-Knowledge
weuseOkamoto’sresultbywhich
H
V
S
Z
K
 
H
V
S
Z
K
j
a
m [Oka96,
Thm. 1].
We stress that, in contrast to the previously mentioned condi-
tionalresults, ourresultfor (unbounded)statistical zero-knowledge
is unconditionalandguarantees(black-box)simulation of all possi-
ble veriﬁer strategies (not only polynomial-time ones). Theorem 3
also provides a transformation for a wide class of computational
zero-knowledgeproofsystems–thatis,theclassofpublic-coinproof
systems. We view our result as a signiﬁcant step towards showing
that
H
V
C
Z
K
 
C
Z
K without relying on any intractability as-
sumptions.
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  The transformation
of Theorem 3 increases the number of rounds of the original proof
system only by a factor of 2. However, the resulting protocol has
noticeable soundnesserror. That is, for any positive polynomial
p,
we can achieve a soundnesserror of
 
 
p
 
j
x
j
 . The soundness er-
ror may be further decreased,while preserving the zero-knowledge
property, by sequential repetition of the proof system. In partic-
ular, to achieve negligible soundness error it sufﬁces to use
 
 
 
 
sequential repetitions. This is unavoidable, unless
N
P
 
B
P
P,
since only
B
P
P languages may have black-box simulation zero-
knowledgepublic-coin proofs with constant number of rounds and
negligible error probability [GK96].
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 89],
we may eliminate completeness error altogether (at the cost of at
most oneadditional round andnot preservingthe complexityof the
prover). (Recall thatthe transformationof [FGM
 89] increasesthe
simulation error by at most an exponentiallyvanishing amount.)
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translatetotheclass
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K(andrespectivelyresultsfor
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translate to
C
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j
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m). For example, using known results regard-
ing
H
V
S
Z
K, one obtains that
S
Z
K is closed under complement,
equals
S
Z
K
j
a
m, hasacompletepromiseproblem,etc. Asomewhat
less straightforward corollary is the following.
Corollary 4 Everylanguagein
S
Z
K has a SZKproofsystemwith
perfect completenessin which the soundnesserrorand the simula-
tion deviation are exponentiallyvanishing.
Given Theorem3(and the discussionabove),the only non-obvious
part in Corollary 4 is the claim about the simulation error. Here we
rely on the result of [SV97] by which every languagein
H
V
S
Z
K
hasa1-roundinteractive proof systemfor whichthehonest-veriﬁer
canbesimulatedwith exponentiallyvanishingsimulationerror. We
4 Recall that if one-way functions exist then
N
P has constant-roundpublic-coin
proofs with negligible soundness error which are honest-veriﬁer computational zero-
knowledge[GMW91]. So,ifTheorem3weretopreserveallitsfeatureswhileresulting
in a proof system with negligible soundness error then
N
P
 
B
P
P would follow
(assuming that one-wayfunctionsexist).alsouseacarefulanalysisofthe
H
V
S
Z
Kto
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Z
K
j
a
m transfor-
mation of [Oka96] by which this transformation increases the sim-
ulation error by at most an exponentially vanishing amount. And
lastly, applying Theorem 3, we use its item 6.
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Theorem 3 is proven by modifying the transformation presentedin
[DGW94]. Whereasthe proof systemsresulting from that transfor-
mation could be simulated only for a constant number of rounds,
our modiﬁedtransformation canbe simulated for any(polynomial)
number of rounds. Both transformations apply to honest-veriﬁer
Arthur-Merlin zero-knowledge proofs (both statistical and compu-
tational).
Inthetransformationof[DGW94], each
 -bitlong(random)mes-
sage sent by Arthur is replaced by an invocation of a 2-round Ran-
dom Selection protocol, for generating strings in
f
 
 
 
g
 . For any
ﬁxed positive polynomial
p, a Random Selection protocol with the
following two properties was presented [DGW94]:
1. AslongasArthurplaysaccordingtotheprotocol,Merlinmay
causethe outcome to deviate from uniform distribution over
f
 
 
 
g
  by at most
 
 
p
 
 
 . (That is, the variation distance is
at most
 
 
p
 
 
 .)
2. AslongasMerlinplaysaccordingtotheprotocol,Arthurmay
notcauseany
 -bit string to appearastheoutcomewith prob-
ability greater than
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . In particular, when Arthur
applies a deterministic cheating strategy, the outcome of the
protocolisuniformlydistributedoversomesetof
 
 
p
 
 
 
4 strings.
The proof system resulting from the above transformation is sim-
ulated in [DGW94] by running the honest-veriﬁer simulator, and
hopingthat all Arthur-messagesincludedin thetranscript fall in the
sets mentioned in Item (2) above. If the proof system uses only a
constant number of invocations of the Random Selection protocol,
then the above sufﬁces for producing a black-box simulation with
respect to any cheating Arthur-strategy. This approach fails when
we have a non-constant number of rounds (Random Selection in-
vocations).
In this paper we modify the above transformation as follows.
Rather thanselectingamessage,weusethe RandomSelectionpro-
tocol to specify (in a succinct manner) a set of
 
n messages. Mer-
lin is then supposedto select a messagefor Arthur, uniformly from
this set. An immediate concern is that this allows Merlin to select
a string which is advantageous for cheating. However, this only
increases Merlin’s cheating probability by a factor of
 
n per each
round. (We can ﬁrst make the original proof system have an even
smaller soundnesserror, so this should not scare us.) So the ques-
tion is what we gained by doing so. Intuitively, we gained not hav-
ing tosimulate theRandomSelectionprotocolfor anypossibleout-
come. Rather than havingto simulate an executionwhich resultsin
any speciﬁc
 -bit output,
 , we only need to simulate an execution
which results in a random set of strings containing
 . The distinc-
tion is important sinceexecutionsof theformer typemayexist only
for a
 
 
p
o
l
y
 
 
 fraction ofthepossible
 ’s,whereas–asweshow–
executions of the latter type exists and can be efﬁciently generated
for all buta
 
 
 
 
n
  fraction of the
 ’s. Provingthe last statementis
a major technicalundertaking of the paper. It is reducedto proving
the following lemma which may be of independentinterest:
Lemma 5 (HashingLemma): Thereexistsauniversalconstant,
c
 
 , so that the following holds, for every
 
 
 
 
 . Let
D and
T be
ﬁnite sets,
H be a 2-universal family of hash functions from
D to
T, and
e
 
T. Let
S
 
H such that
j
S
j
 
 
j
H
j, and
X be a
randomvariable rangingover a ﬁnite set
D having collision prob-
ability at most
 
j
T
j (i.e.,
P
x
 
D
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
 
 
 
j
T
j). Then the sta-
tistical differencebetweenthe followingtwo randomprocessesisat
most
c
 
 
 
 
c
 
 
c.
(A) Select
h uniformly in
S, and let
x be selected from
X condi-
tioned on
h
 
X
 
 
e. Output
 
h
 
x
 .
(B) Let
x
 
X, and
h be selected uniformly among all
h
 
H
satisfying
h
 
x
 
 
e. Output
 
h
 
x
 .
Actually, a specialcase of this lemma, where
X is uniform over
D
(and
j
T
j
 
 
 
j
D
j) sufﬁces for the current proof of Theorem 3.
Thus, only a proof of this special case is given in this version. The
strongerversionwasdevelopedfor analternative proof, discovered
ﬁrst, which is totally supersededby the current proof.
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Whenever we consider an interactive proof system,
x will denote
thecommoninputand
n will bethe lengthof
x. For notationalcon-
venience,we will often hide dependenceon
x or
n when it is clear.
For example, we write
r instead of
r
 
n
 .
If
X and
Y are random variables, we write
k
X
 
Y
k for their
statistical difference(or variationdistance),deﬁnedas
k
X
 
Y
k
 
 
 
 
P
x
j
P
r
 
X
 
x
 
 
P
r
 
Y
 
x
 
j
 . By
x
 
X, we mean taking
a sample
x from random variable
X. If
S is a set
x
 
R
S indicates
that
x is chosenuniformly from
S.
 
T
h
e
s
t
a
r
t
i
n
g
p
r
o
o
f
s
y
s
t
e
m
Theorem 3 is proven by combining two transformations. The ﬁrst
transformation is obtainedby parallel repetition, and is statedwith-
out proof below.
  The protocols resulting from this transformation
are the starting point for our main transformation, statedin the next
section.
Lemma 3.1 Let
L be a language having a honest-veriﬁer statis-
tical (resp., computational) zero-knowledgepublic-coin proof sys-
tems of
r rounds. Then
L hassucha (
r-round honest-veriﬁer)zero-
knowledge(public-coin) proofsystem in which
1. Theproverstrategycanbeimplementedinprobabilisticpolynomial-
time given oracle accessto the original proverstategy.
2. Thecompletenesserrorisexponentaillyvanishing,andincase
the original proof system has perfect completeness so does
the resulting one.
3. Soundnesserroris less than
 
 
n
 
 
r
 
 
 .
4. For
L
 
H
V
S
Z
K: The simulator deviation is at most a
polynomial factor greaterthan the original one.
 
T
h
e
t
r
a
n
s
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
Fix a language
L in
H
V
S
Z
K or
H
V
C
Z
K
j
a
m and let
 
M
 
A
  be
the proof system guaranteed by Lemma 3.1. Let
r
 
r
 
n
  be the
number of rounds of
 
M
 
A
  and let
 
 
 
 
n
  be the length of
A’s
messages. We may describe this proof system as follows:
5 Recall thathonest-veriﬁerzero-knowledgepropertiesare preservedunderparallel
repetition.O
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
P
r
o
o
f
S
y
s
t
e
m
 
M
 
A
 
 
o
n
i
n
p
u
t
x
 
1. In round
i (
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r),
(a)
A choosesa message
 
i
 
R
f
 
 
 
g
  andsendsit to
M.
(b)
M sends a response
 
i
 
M
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
to
A.
2. After round
r, machine
A deterministically decides whether
to accept or reject.
Thereasonsuchaprotocolcouldbezero-knowledgeagainstthehon-
est veriﬁer but not against dishonest veriﬁers is that nothing pre-
vents
A from choosing the
 
i’s maliciously rather than uniformly.
Theideaofourtransformationistoreplace
A’srandomchoiceswith
a Random Selection protocol (to be described in Section 5) which
guaranteesthatthe
 
i’s arestatistically closetouniform, regardless
ofhow
Abehaves. Thenewprotocol, denoted
 
M
 
A
 , proceedsas
follows.
T
r
a
n
s
f
o
r
m
e
d
P
r
o
o
f
S
y
s
t
e
m
 
M
 
A
 
 
o
n
i
n
p
u
t
x
 
1. In stage
i (
i
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r),
(a)
M and
A use the Random Selection protocol,
R
S
 
n
r
 
n
 
 
 
 
n
 
 
n
 , to select
 
i
 
f
 
 
 
g
 .
(b)
Msendstheresponse
 
i
 
M
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
to
A.
2. After stage
r, machine
A accepts or rejects as
A would on
transcript
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
r
 .
We will prove the following about the Transformed Proof Sys-
tem:
Lemma 4.1 TheTransformedProofSystem
 
M
 
A
 hasthefollow-
ing properties:
1. Thenumberofroundsistwicethenumberofroundsin
 
M
 
A
 .
2.
Mcanbeimplementedinprobabilisticpolynomialtimegiven
oracleaccessto
M.
3. The completeness error is exponentially vanishing. In case
 
M
 
A
  has perfect completeness,so does
 
M
 
A
 .
4. Soundnesserror
 
 
n.
5. When
 
M
 
A
  is Honest-VeriﬁerStatistical (resp., Computa-
tional) Zero-Knowledge,
 
M
 
A
  is Statistical (resp., Com-
putational) Zero-Knowledge,and this zero-knowledgeprop-
erty is exhibited by a black-box simulator.
6. In the case of Statistical Zero-Knowledge, the simulator de-
viation is at most
 
 
 
 
n
  greaterthan that of
 
M
 
A
 .
Theorem 3, follows immediately from Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1.
 
WenowinformallyexplainwhyLemma4.1holds. Alloftheseprop-
erties dependon facts about our Random Selection protocol which
will be proven in subsequentsections. Property 1 follows from the
fact that our Random Selection Protocol consists of 2 rounds with
Merlin sending the last message. Property 2 is clear, given that the
Merlin’s strategy in the Random Selection protocol can be imple-
mented in probabilistic polynomial time.
Property 3, the completeness error, follows from the fact that
 
M
 
A
 hasexponentiallyvanishingcompletenesserrorandthefact
that when
M behaves honestly in the Random Selection protocol,
the
 ’s will have only have a statistical difference of
 
 
 
 
n
  from
uniform. It is obviousthat perfect completenessispreservedby our
6For ease of presentation, we only show how to obtain a soundnesserror of
1
 
n,
but this can be replaced with any inverse polynomial.
transformation. Forsoundness(Property4, wewill showthatin our
Random Selection protocol, a cheating
M cannot make the output
lie in any set
S
 
f
 
 
 
g
  with probability greater that
 
n
 
j
S
j
 
 
 
 
 
n
r. This gives
M essentiallyan extra
 
n factor of freedom (com-
paredto what
M has) at eachstage. Over
r stages,we expect
M to
succeed with probability
 
r
n times greater than
M can. But since
theoriginal
 
M
 
A
  protocolhassoundnesserror
 
 
 
r
 
 
 
n,
Mstill
hasonlyanexponentiallysmallchanceofsucceeding. Theadditive
error term of
 
 
 
n
r alsoaccumulatesto give anadditional additive
factor of
 
 
 
n to thesoundnesserror over
r rounds,yieldinga total
soundnesserror less than
 
 
n. A more detailed proof of soundness
will be given in the full version of the paper [GSV98].
Theproofofzero-knowledgeness(Properties5and6)isthema-
jor technicalundertaking of the paper, andit too reducesto proper-
ties ofour RandomSelectionprotocol. Wewill demonstratethat no
matter whatstrategytheveriﬁerfollows, the
 
i’s will bedistributed
statistically closeto uniform. Moreover, wewill showthatthe Ran-
dom Selectionprotocol satisﬁesa strongsimulability property: Us-
ingtheveriﬁeralgorithm asablack-boxsubroutineandgivenaran-
dom
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
 , one can efﬁciently simulate the distribution of
Random Selection transcripts which yield
 . Thus, a simulator for
the Transformed Proof System could operate as follows: Run the
honest veriﬁer simulator for the original proof system to produce a
transcriptof
 
i’sand
 
i’s; thenusethestrongsimulatorfortheRan-
dom Selection protocol to “ﬁll in” how the
 
i’s are chosen. These
intuitive arguments will be made precise in the next few sections.
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
S
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
Let
q and
 beanypolynomials. Inthissection,wedescribeanArthur-
Merlin protocol
R
S
q
 
 
 
n
 
 
 
M
R
S
 
A
R
S
 
 
n
  for randomly se-
lecting a string in
f
 
 
 
g
 
 
n
 . The protocol employs the Random
selection protocol
D
G
W
q
 
 
 
n
 
 
 
M
D
 
A
D
  of [DGW94] as a
subprotocol,andthefollowingpresentationisadaptedfrom that pa-
per.
For notational convenience, we will write
q to mean
q
 
n
  and
  to mean
 
 
n
 . Let
H be the space of afﬁne linear functions from
f
 
 
 
g
  to
f
 
 
 
g
 
 
n, i.e.
h
 
H is of the form
h
 
x
 
 
A
x
 
b for
some appropriately sizedmatrix
A and vector
b.
  For
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
 ,
we write
H
  for
f
h
 
H
 
h
 
 
 
 
 
g. Let
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
 
 
 
 
 
n
  and
t
 
s
 
 
l
o
g
 
 
 
q
s
 . Note that elementsof
f
 
 
 
g
s can
be viewed as elements from
H. The protocol
D
G
W
q
 
  utilizes a
spaceof functions
F from
f
 
 
 
g
s to
f
 
 
 
g
t satisfying the follow-
ing properties:
1. Each
f
 
F has a description of size
p
o
l
y
 
n
 .
2. There is a
p
o
l
y
 
n
 -time algorithm that, on input
f
 
F and
h
 
f
 
 
 
g
s, outputs
f
 
h
 .
3. There is a
p
o
l
y
 
n
 -time algorithm that, on input
f
 
F,
y
 
f
 
 
 
g
t,listsalltheelementsof
f
 
 
 
y
 . Inparticular,
j
f
 
 
 
y
 
j
 
p
 
n
  for some polynomial
p.
4. For every
y
 
f
 
 
 
g
s and
f
 
F,
f
 
 
 
y
  is nonempty.
5.
F isafamily ofalmost
s-wiseindependenthashingfunctions
inthefollowingsense: Forevery
sdistinctpoints
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
h
s
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
s
n
f
 
 
 
g
t
 
s
 
t
 , for a uniformly chosen
f
 
F, the
randomvariables
f
 
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f
 
h
s
 areindependentlyanduni-
formly distributed in
f
 
 
 
g
t. (This property is used only for
the proof ofthe soundnessconditionof theprotocol, foundin
[DGW94].)
7Any 2-universal family for which the required computationsare feasible can be
used; we use this particular family for simplicity and ease of presentation.An explicit constructionof sucha family is given in [DGW94]. We
can view each
f
 
F as deﬁninga partition of
f
 
 
 
g
s into
 
t cells
of the form
f
 
 
 
y
 , each of size
p
o
l
y
 
n
 . For notational conve-
nience, we will sometimes write cell
y to refer to the cell
f
 
 
 
y
 .
We now describe the protocol of [DGW94]:
T
h
e
D
G
W
R
a
n
d
o
m
S
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
t
o
c
o
l
D
G
W
q
 
 
 
 
M
D
 
A
D
 
 
n
 :
1.
A
D selects
f
 
R
F, and sends it to
M
D (i.e.,
A
D selects a
random partition).
2.
M
D selects
y
 
R
f
 
 
 
g
t, and sendsit to
A
D (i.e.,
M
D uni-
formly selects a cell).
3.
A
D selects
h
 
R
f
 
 
 
y
  (i.e.
A
D uniformly selects an ele-
ment of the cell).
4. Output
h.
If, at any step,
A
D or
M
D do not select an object from the appro-
priate set, whatever messagethey sendis interpreted as a canonical
element of that set. In [DGW94], it was shown that the above pro-
tocol has the following properties (roughly speaking):
1. (Soundness) For any Merlin strategy
M
 
D, the output distri-
bution on
H
 
f
 
 
 
g
s of
 
M
 
D
 
A
D
  deviatesfrom uniform
by at most
 
 
q (in statistical difference).
2. (Simulability) Let
A
 
D be any strategy for Arthur. At least
a
 
 
p
o
l
y
 
n
  fraction of the
h’s in
f
 
 
 
g
s occur as possible
outputs of the interaction
 
M
D
 
A
 
D
  and given such an
h,
one can simulate in
p
o
l
y
 
n
 -time
A
 
D’s view of an interac-
tion resulting in
h.
Themainhindranceinapplyingtheprotocolasusedby[DGW94]
is that the simulator is only guaranteed to work for a
 
 
p
o
l
y
 
n
 
fraction of the
h’s. The new technique of this paper is to interpret
the output
h
 
H of the DGW protocol as a set of strings (namely
h
 
 
 
 
 ), from whichasinglestring
 israndomlyselectedbyMer-
lin. Itisthis
 , ratherthan
h, thatistheoutputoftheRandomSelec-
tionprotocol. Thus,weonlyneedtosimulatetheRandomSelection
protocolfor arandom
 ratherthanarandom
h. Foragiven
 ,there
are exponentially many hash functions
h such that
h
 
 
 
 
 . Be-
causethis spaceof
h’s issolargeandcoversthe
 ’snear-uniformly,
we are able to perform the simulation for a
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
  fraction of
the
 ’s.
A full description of our Random Selection protocol follows.
O
u
r
R
a
n
d
o
m
S
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
t
o
c
o
l
R
S
q
 
 
 
 
M
R
S
 
A
R
S
 
 
n
 :
1–3. As in
D
G
W
q
 
 
 
n
 .
4.
M
R
S selects
 
 
R
h
 
 
 
 
 . (If
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
 then
 isdeﬁned
to be
 
 .)
5. Output
 .
As with the DGW protocol, if
A
R
S or
M
R
S do not selectan object
from the appropriateset at any step, whatevermessagetheysend is
interpreted as acanonicalelementof that set. Theproperties of this
protocol are describedin the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Foranypolynomials
q and
 , the RandomSelection
protocol
R
S
q
 
  is a 2-roundprotocolwith thefollowing properties:
1. (Efﬁciency)Both
M
R
S and
A
R
S canbe implementedin time
p
o
l
y
 
n
  and the protocol is public-coin for both parties.
2. (Soundness)Forall Merlin strategies
M
 
R
S and all sets
S
 
f
 
 
 
g
 , the probability that the output of
 
M
 
R
S
 
A
R
S
 
 
n
 
lies in
S is at most
 
n
 
j
S
j
 
 
 
 
q
3. (StrongSimulability) Thereexistsablack-boxsimulator
S
R
S
runningintime
p
o
l
y
 
n
 ,suchthatforalldeterministic
 Arthur
strategies
A
 
R
S, the statistical differencebetweenthe follow-
ing distributions is
 
 
 
 
n
 :
(I) Execute
 
A
 
R
S
 
M
R
S
 
 
n
 , let
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
  be the output
of the protocol, and let
v be
A
 
R
S’s view of the interac-
tion (i.e.,
v is a transcript
 
f
 
y
 
h
 
 
 ).
 
(II) Choose
 uniformlyfrom
f
 
 
 
g
 . Output
 
S
A
 
R
S
R
S
 
 
 
 
 
 .
R
e
m
a
r
k
  The
 ’s are included in the outputs of Distributions
(I) and (II) above to force the simulator to produce a transcript for
an externallyspeciﬁed
  (rather than an
  which it generateson its
own while producing the transcript.)
Proof: Efﬁciency is immediate from the description of the pro-
tocol and the properties of the families
F and
H. For Soundness,
let
M
 
R
S be any cheating Merlin strategy and consider an execu-
tion of the protocol
 
M
 
R
S
 
A
R
S
 . Notice that that the probability
that the output
  lies in some set
S is bounded above by the prob-
ability that
h
 
 
 
 
  contains an element of
S. Now, for
h chosen
uniformly from
H (instead of by the protocol), the probability that
h
 
 
 
 
  contains an element of
S is at most
X
 
 
S
P
r
h
 
R
H
 
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
S
j
 
 
 
n
 
In our protocol,
h is chosen using the DGW protocol. It shown in
[DGW94, Prop. 1] that a cheating Merlin can cause at most a
 
 
q
statistical difference from the uniform distribution on
H, andso the
Soundnessproperty follows.
We now describe the simulator which will be used to establish
Strong Simulability. Recall that
p is polynomial bound on the size
of
f
 
 
 
y
  for any
f
 
F,
s is the description length for elements
of
H, and functions in
F map
f
 
 
 
g
s to
f
 
 
 
g
t, where
t
 
s
 
 
l
o
g
 
 
 
q
s
 .
T
h
e
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
o
r
S
A
 
R
S
R
S
 
o
n
i
n
p
u
t
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
 
 
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
s
a
s
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
 
S1. Let
f
 
F be the ﬁrst messagesent by
A
 
R
S.
S2. Repeat the following up to
n
 
 
 
 
s
q
 
 
 
p times:
(a) Choose
h
  uniformlyfrom
H
  (Recallthat
H
 
 
f
h
 
h
 
 
 
 
 
g.
(b) Let
y
 
f
 
h
 
  (i.e.,
y is the cell containing
h
 ). Com-
pute
k
d
e
f
 
j
f
 
 
 
y
 
 
H
 
j. With probability
 
 
 
k, pro-
ceedto next iteration of StepS2. (Otherwise continue.)
(c) Let
h
 
A
 
R
S
 
y
 , that is, the element (hereafter called
thecellrepresentative)ofcell
y that
A
 
R
S givesinStep3
after being sent
y in Step 2.
(d) If
h
 
 
 
 
 , output
 
 
f
 
y
 
h
 
 
 
 
 
  and terminate the
simulation. Otherwise,proceedtonextiterationofStepS2.
S3. If the simulator failed to produce output so far, output
f
a
i
l.
8The restriction to deterministic Arthur strategies is only for ease of presentation,
as a simulator for randomized Arthur strategies can uniformlyselect and ﬁx Arthur’s
coinsandthenuse thesimulatorfordeterministicstrategies. Whenwe usethe Random
Selection simulator as a subroutine in the simulator for the Transformed Protocol in
Section 6, the coins of Arthur will have already been ﬁxed by the outer simulator.
9In Section 1.1, we deﬁned the Veriﬁer’s view to consist of his random coins and
theProver’smessages. Here,wedonotincluderandomcoins,astheyareirrelevantfor
deterministic strategies. We also include Arthur’s messages — this is unnecessary as
they are functionsof Merlin’smessages, but it will be convenientfor ourpresentation.From the various properties of the families
F and
H, such as
the fact that
f
 
 
 
y
  can be enumerated in time
p
o
l
y
 
n
 , and the
fact that
s,
q, and
p are all
p
o
l
y
 
n
 , we see immediately that the
running time of
S
A
 
R
S
R
S is
p
o
l
y
 
n
 .
Let us now show that Distributions (I) and (II) in Proposition 1
havestatisticaldifference
 
 
 
 
n
 . Eachproducesoutputoftheform
 
 
f
 
y
 
h
 
 
 
 
 
 . In both cases,
f is the (deterministically chosen)
ﬁrst messageof
A
 
R
S and
y
 
f
 
h
 , so it sufﬁces to show that the
distributions restricted to their
 
h
 
 
  components are statistically
close. We therefore deﬁne the Distributions (I’) and (II’) to be the
Distributions (I) and (II) restricted to their
 
h
 
 
  components. To
analyze these distributions, we make use of the following Lemma,
theproof ofwhichisin Section7. (As statedin theintroduction, we
canalso prove a muchmore general form of this lemma. The proof
is omitted in this abstract.)
Lemma 5.1 Thereexistsauniversalconstant
c
 
 ,sothatthefol-
lowing holds: Let
H be the family of afﬁne-linear maps from
D
 
f
 
 
 
g
  to
T
 
f
 
 
 
g
 
 
, i.e.
h
 
H is of the form
h
 
x
 
 
A
x
 
b
for some matrix
A and vector
b. Let
S
 
H be such that
j
S
j
 
 
j
H
j. Let
 
 
j
T
j
j
D
j. Then
Part 1: The statistical differencebetweenthe following two distri-
butions is at most
 
c
 
 
 
 
c
 
 
c
 :
(A) Choose
h
 
R
S. Let
x
 
R
h
 
 
 
 
 . Output
 
h
 
x
 .
(B) Choose
x
 
R
D. Let
h
 
R
S
 
H
x. Output
 
h
 
x
 .
Part 2: For at least a
 
 
 
c
 
 
 
 
c
 
 
c
  fraction of
x
 
D,
j
S
 
H
x
j
j
H
x
j
 
 
 
 
 
When we apply the lemma, we take
 
 
 
 
 
n,
 
 
 
 
n, and
S
 
f
A
 
R
S
 
y
 
 
y
 
f
 
 
 
g
t
g. In other words,
S is the set all possi-
ble cell representativesthat
A
 
R
S can sendin Step 3 of the protocol
 
M
R
S
 
A
 
R
S
 . Notice that
 
d
e
f
 
j
S
j
j
H
j
 
 
t
 
s
 
 
 
 
l
o
g
2
 
 
s
q
 
 
 
 
 
s
q
 
 
 
and so,
c
 
 
 
 
c
 
 
c
 
 
 
 
 
n
 . Now, observe that the protocol
 
M
R
S
 
A
 
R
S
  selects
h uniformly from
S. (Recall that
A
 
R
S is de-
terministic.) Thus, Distribution (I’) is exactly Distribution (A) of
Lemma 5.1. Now we will show that the Distribution (II’) is statis-
tically close to Distribution (B).
Let us consider a single iteration of Step S2 in
S
A
 
R
S
R
S . In such
an iteration,
h
  is chosen uniformly from
H
 , and
y
 
f
 
h
 
 . We
write
f
 
H
 
  to denotethe setof imagesof elementsof
H
  under
f
(i.e.,
f
 
H
 
 
 
f
f
 
h
 
 
h
 
H
 
g). In otherwords,
f
 
H
 
  isthe set
of cells intersecting
H
 . We want to establish that the distribution
of
h’s produced by the simulator will be uniform in
S
 
H
 . In
order for this to happen,
y must beuniformly selectedfrom
f
 
H
 
 .
If
f was chosenhonestlyby
A
 
R
S, we would expectit to be one-to-
one on the set
H
 , since
H
  is a vanishingly small fraction of the
domain. However,
f is chosen adversarially, so we must do some
work to ensure uniformity:
Notice that for any
y
 
 
f
 
H
 
 , the probability that
f
 
h
 
 
 
y
  whenuniformlyselecting
h
 
 
H
  isexactly
j
H
 
 
f
 
 
 
y
 
 
j
 
j
H
 
j.
InStepS2b,anysuchchoiceismaintainedwithprobability
 
 
j
H
 
 
f
 
 
 
y
 
 
j. Thusthe probabilitythat
y
 
y
  after StepsS2aandS2b
in
S
R
S is exactly
 
 
j
H
 
j. This is independent of
y
 , and there-
fore
y is a uniformly chosen element of
f
 
H
 
  — that is, a uni-
formly chosencell intersecting
H
 . (Theseprobabilities sum up to
j
f
 
H
 
 
j
 
j
H
 
j, which may be less than 1; this is due to the possi-
bility that the iteration endsprematurely in Step S2b.)
Now, since, in Step S2c,
h
 
A
 
R
S
 
y
  is taken to be the repre-
sentative of cell
y, the function
h is uniformly distributed over the
representatives of cells which intersect
H
 . In Step S2d, we aban-
don any
h not in
H
 , so the resulting distribution on
h is uniform
overcell representativesin
H
 , that is, uniform over
S
 
H
 . Thus
a single iteration of the loop producesan
h uniformly chosen from
S
 
H
 , if it manages to produce output at all. This is identical
to how
h is chosen in Distribution (B) of Lemma 5.1. So, to show
that the Distribution (II’) is statistically close to Distribution (B),
we need only to show that the probability that the repeat loop fails
to produce output in all its
p
o
l
y
 
n
  iterations is
 
 
 
 
n
  for at least
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
  fraction of the
 ’s in
f
 
 
 
g
 . We do this by showing
that eachiteration producesoutput with probability at least
n times
the reciprocal of the number of iterations.
Therearetwoplacesinwhichaniterationcanbeexited,causing
it to fail to produce output — Steps S2b and S2d. Observe that the
simulator never exits in Step S2d if
h
  chosen in Step S2a lies in
S, becausethen
h will equal
h
 . This occurs with probability
j
S
 
H
 
j
 
j
H
 
j
  By Lemma 5.1, for at least a
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
  fraction of
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
 , this quantity is at least
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
q
 
 .
Now supposethat
h
  has been chosen in
S. The probability of
not exiting in Step S2b is at least
 
 
j
f
 
 
 
y
 
j, which is at least
 
 
p
bythepropertiesof thefamily
F. Thus,for a
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
  fractionof
the
 ’s, a single iteration produces output with probability at least
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
q
 
 
 
p
 . Since there are
 
 
 
 
s
q
 
 
 
p
 
 
n iterations, output
is produced with probability
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
 .
We haveshownthat Distribution (I’) is identicalto Distribution
(A) in Lemma 5.1 and Distribution (II’) has a statistical difference
of
 
 
 
 
n
  from Distribution (B). So, by Lemma 5.1, we conclude
that Distributions (I) and (II) have statistical difference
 
 
 
 
n
  and
Strong Simulability is established.
 
S
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
e
T
r
a
n
s
f
o
r
m
e
d
P
r
o
t
o
c
o
l
In this section, we describe the simulator for the protocol
 
M
 
A
 
of Section 4. Let
S be the simulator for the honest veriﬁer in the
original protocol
 
M
 
A
 . We will give a universal simulator
S for
 
M
 
A
  which uses any veriﬁer strategy
A
  as a black-box.
T
h
e
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
o
r
S
A
 
 
o
n
i
n
p
u
t
x
 
1. Uniformly chooseand ﬁx random coins
c for
A
  to obtain a
deterministic strategy
A
 
 
 .
2. Runtheoriginalhonest-veriﬁersimulatortoobtainatranscript
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
r
 
 
S
 
x
 .
3. For
i
 
  to
r, do the following:
(a) Runthestrongsimulator for theRandomSelectionpro-
tocol, on input
 
i with Arthur strategy
A
 
i
 , to obtain a
simulated transcript
t
i of the Random Selection proto-
col (i.e.,
t
i
 
S
A
(
i
)
R
S
 
 
i
 ).
(b) Let
A
 
i
 
 
  be the state of
A
 
i
  after additional history
t
i
 
 
i
 
 
i.
4. Output
 
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
r
 
 
r
 
 
r
 
c
 .
To provethat theabovesimulator hasthedesiredproperties, we
ﬁrstconsideritsoutputdistributioninthecasethattheoriginalhonest-
veriﬁer simulator
S is perfect: Let
S
A
 
be the output distribution
of
S
A
 
if the output of
S in Step 2 is replaced with a true sample
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
 
 
r
  of the protocol
 
M
 
A
 . By an induction ar-
gument using the strong simulability property of the Random Se-
lection protocol, it is easyto show the following:Claim 6.1
S
A
 
 
x
  and
 
M
 
A
 
 
 
x
  have statistical difference at
most
 
 
 
 
n
 .
The proof of Claim 6.1 can be found in the full version of the
paper [GSV98]. Now we deduce Lemma 4.1, Parts 5 and 6, from
Claim 6.1.
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
Z
e
r
o
 
K
n
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  Usingtheoutputof
S insteadofa
true samplefrom
 
M
 
A
  canincreasethe simulator deviationbyat
most
k
S
 
x
 
 
 
M
 
A
 
 
x
 
k,whichisexactlythesimulatordeviation
for the protocol
 
M
 
A
 .
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  We claim that the probabil-
ityensembles
X
 
d
e
f
 
f
 
M
 
A
 
 
 
x
 
g
x
 
L and
X
 
d
e
f
 
f
S
A
 
 
x
 
g
x
 
L
arecomputationallyindistinguishableforanyprobabilisticpolynomial-
time
A
 . Considertheensemble
X
 
d
e
f
 
f
S
A
 
 
x
 
g
x
 
L. ByClaim6.1,
X
  and
X
  are statistically closeand therefore computationally in-
distinguishable. We claim that
X
  and
X
  are computationally in-
distinguishable,foranyprobabilisticpolynomial-time
A
 . Thisholds
becauseanydistinguisher
Dbetween
X
  and
X
  canbetransformed
into adistinguisher
D
  between
f
 
M
 
A
 
 
x
 
g
x
 
L and
f
S
 
x
 
g
x
 
L,
whicharecomputationallyindistinguishablebyhypothesis. Thenew
distinguisher
D
  operates as follows: Given a transcript
T of ei-
ther of thelatter two ensembles,perform theprocedurespeciﬁedby
S
A
 
, replacing the execution in Step 2 with
T, and feed the output
of
S
A
 
to
D. When
T is selected according to
f
 
M
 
A
 
 
x
 
g
x
 
L,
D is fed with ensemble
X
 , whereaswhen
T is selectedaccording
to
f
S
 
x
 
g
x
 
L,
D is fed with ensemble
X
 .
R
e
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k
  The above proof actually shows that, for any (not just
probabilistic polynomial-time) veriﬁer
A
 , if
 
M
 
A
 
  and
S
A
 
can be distinguished by algorithm
D, then there is an algorithm no
morepowerful than
A
  and
D (i.e., aprobabilisticpolynomialtime
machine with oracle access to
A
  and
D) that can distinguish the
original honest-veriﬁer proof system
 
M
 
A
  from its simulator
S.
So,ifthehonest-veriﬁersimulatorproducestranscriptsindistinguish-
ablefrom
 
M
 
A
 byanymachinerunningin,say,quasi-polynomial
time, then the new protocol
 
M
 
A
  is zero-knowledge against all
quasi-polynomial time veriﬁers.
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Here we provide a proof of the Hashing Lemma used to establish
the main result of this paper. We restate the lemma here:
Lemma 7.1 (Hashing Lemma) There exists a universal constant
c
 
 , so that the following holds: Let
H be the family of afﬁne-
linear maps from
D
 
f
 
 
 
g
  to
T
 
f
 
 
 
g
 
 
, i.e.
h
 
H is
of the form
h
 
x
 
 
A
x
 
b for some matrix
A and vector
b. Let
S
 
H be suchthat
j
S
j
 
 
j
H
j. Let
 
 
j
T
j
j
D
j. Then
Part 1: The statistical difference between the following two distri-
butions is at most
c
 
 
 
 
c
 
 
c:
A
 
 
A
H
 
A
X
 : Let
h
 
R
S. Let
x
 
R
h
 
 
 
 
 . Output
 
h
 
x
 .
B
 
 
B
H
 
B
X
 : Let
x
 
R
D. Let
h
 
R
S
 
H
x. Output
 
h
 
x
 .
Part 2: For at least a
 
 
 
c
 
 
 
 
c
 
 
c
  fraction of
x
 
D,
j
S
 
H
x
j
j
H
x
j
 
 
 
 
j
S
j
j
H
j
 
 
 
 
Proof: We deﬁne a perfect hash function
h
 
H to be one of the
form
h
 
x
 
 
A
x
 
b, where the matrix
A is full rank (and hence
h
is surjective). Note that a straightforward calculation shows that at
most an
  fraction of the functions in
H are not perfect.
We ﬁrst establish Part 1 of the Hashing Lemma for the special
case of perfect hash functions.
Sublemma 7.2 Part 1 of the Hashing Lemma holds when
S con-
tains only perfect hash functions.
Proof: First, we consider the relationship between distributions
A
X and
B
X.
Claim 7.3
k
A
X
 
B
X
k
 
 
 
1
 
3
  .
Proof: Note
B
X is uniform over
D. To establishthe claim, it suf-
ﬁces to show that for all
C
 
D,
 
 
 
 
P
r
 
A
X
 
C
 
 
j
C
j
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note
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r
 
A
X
 
C
 
 
j
C
j
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
r
 
A
X
 
 
D
n
C
 
 
 
j
D
n
C
j
j
D
j
 
 
 , so
it sufﬁcesto considersets
C suchthat
j
C
j
j
D
j
 
 
 . Fromthedeﬁnition
of
A, we observe:
P
r
 
A
X
 
C
 
 
 
j
S
j
X
h
 
S
j
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
j
j
h
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
j
S
j
X
h
 
S
 
 
j
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
j
where the last equality is dueto our assumptionthat every
h
 
S is
perfect, and hence
j
h
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
 
 .
Toanalyzetheexpressionabove,whichreferstoasumover
h
 
S, we ﬁrst considerthe behaviourof the sumover all
h
 
H. Here,
we can use Chebyshev’sinequality. Consider the probability space
uniform over
H, and deﬁne, for every
x
 
C, an indicator random
variable:
 
x
 
h
 
 
 
  if
h
 
x
 
 
 
  otherwise
Let
W
C
 
h
 
 
 
 
j
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
j
 
 
 
P
x
 
C
 
x
 
h
 . Since
H is
a 2-universal family of hash functions, the
 
x’s are pairwise inde-
pendent with
P
r
h
 
H
 
 
x
 
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
T
j
 
 
 
 
j
D
j. Thus, we have
that:
E
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W
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h
 
 
 
 
 
X
x
 
C
E
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h
 
 
 
j
C
j
j
D
j
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By Chebyshev’sinequality,
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D
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j
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D
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W
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j
j
D
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j
D
j
j
C
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where the last inequality is because
j
C
j
 
j
D
j
 
 . Since
j
S
j
j
H
j
 
 ,
we canapplythe aboveto theprobability spaceuniform over
S and
conclude,
P
r
h
 
S
 
 
 
 
 
W
C
 
h
 
 
j
C
j
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
C
j
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Recall,
P
r
 
A
X
 
C
 
 
 
j
S
j
X
h
 
S
W
C
 
h
 
 
Hence, for all but at most
 
 
1
 
3
 
 
j
S
j terms in the sum, we have
that
 
 
 
W
C
 
h
 
 
j
C
j
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
C
j
j
D
j. Since for every
h it is true that
 
 
W
C
 
h
 
 
 , we have,
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A
X
 
C
 
 
j
C
j
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
C
j
j
D
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And the claim is proved.
We are now ready to complete the proof of this sublemma. For
all
x
 
D and all
h
 
S such that
h
 
x
 
 
 , we have, by Bayes’
Law:
P
r
 
A
H
 
h
j
A
X
 
x
 
 
P
r
 
A
X
 
x
j
A
H
 
h
 
 
P
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A
H
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A
X
 
x
 
 
j
h
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
 
j
S
j
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A
X
 
x
 
 
 
 
j
S
j
 
 
P
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A
X
 
x
 
where the last step is because for all perfect
h,
j
h
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
 
 .
Note that this value has no dependence on
h. Hence, for every
x,
given
A
X
 
x, the distribution
A
H is uniform over
f
h
 
S
 
h
 
x
 
 
 
g. Note that for all
x, given
B
X
 
x,
B
H is also uni-
form over the same set. Thus, conditioned on the value of
x, the
distributions
A
H and
B
H are identical.
Hence
k
A
 
B
k
 
k
A
X
 
B
X
k
 
 
 , and the sublemma is
established.
Before we argue Part 1 of the Hashing Lemma in general, we
will show how Part 2 follows from Sublemma 7.2. In the sequel,
it will be convenient to introduce the following notation: For any
subset
I
 
H, we will write
I
x to denote the set
f
h
 
I
 
h
 
x
 
 
 
g.
InordertoapplySublemma7.2,wewillconsiderthesubset
S
 
 
S of all perfect hashfunctions in
S. Since less thanan
  fraction of
all hashfunctionsarenotperfect,
j
S
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
S
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
H
j.
Similarly, wedeﬁnethefollowingtwomodiﬁcationsofthedistribu-
tions
A and
B, using
S
  instead of
S:
A
 
 
 
A
 
H
 
A
 
X
 : Let
h
 
R
S
 . Let
x
 
R
h
 
 
 
 
 . Output
 
h
 
x
 .
B
 
 
 
B
 
H
 
B
 
X
 : Let
x
 
R
D. Let
h
 
R
S
 
 
H
x. Output
 
h
 
x
 .
The following claim establishesPart 2 of the Hashing Lemma:
Claim 7.4 Let
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  . For at least a
 
 
 
p
 
 
  fraction of
x
 
D
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x
j
j
H
x
j
 
 
 
 
 
Proof: By the deﬁnition of
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X,
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j
X
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j
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j
where the last equality follows because
j
h
 
 
 
 
 
j
 
 
 
  for all
h
 
S
 . However,by theSublemma,
k
A
 
X
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X
k
 
 
 . Notethat
B
 
X
is uniform over
D, so for a
 
 
 
p
 
 
  fraction of
x
 
D, it must be
that
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j
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j
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where the last equality follows from
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j
T
j and
j
T
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j
H
x
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j
H
j. Using the fact that
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j
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j
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S
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j
H
j, we have, for a
 
 
 
p
 
 
  fraction of
x
 
D,
j
S
x
j
j
H
x
j
 
 
 
 
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that the ﬁnalinequality follows becausewe cansafelyassume
that
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . This is because we can freely assume that
c
 
 
 
 
c
 
 
c
 
 , sinceotherwisethe statement of the HashingLemma
becomestrivially satisﬁed. Since
p
 
 
 
 
  is upper boundedby
k
 
 
 
 
k
 
 
k for someconstant
k, ourassumptioncanbemadeto imply
that
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  by choosing
c
 
 
k.
Finally, weestablishPart 1oftheHashingLemmain generalby
showing that the presenceof imperfect hash functions will not dis-
turb our computations. First, we see immediately that since
j
S
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
S
j, the statistical difference between
A and
A
  can be at
most
 
 . To see that the statistical difference between
B
  and
B is
sufﬁcientlysmall,it sufﬁcestoshowthatforalmostall
x, theproba-
bility that
B
H outputsanimperfect hashfunction, giventhat
B
X
 
x, is small. First we argue:
Claim 7.5 For every
x
 
D
 
P
r
h
 
H
x
 
h is imperfect
 
 
 .
Proof: Observe that for any
x
 
D,
H
x consistsexactly of those
functions
h
 
y
 
 
A
y
 
b where
b
 
 
A
x. Thus, there is exactly
one function in
H
x for every matrix
A. Hence, the fraction of im-
perfect functions in
H
x is precisely the fraction of matrices
A that
do not have full rank, which is at most
 .
For any
x
 
D, the probability that
B
H outputs an imperfect
hash function given that
B
X
 
x is
P
r
h
 
S
x
 
h is imperfect
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h
 
H
x
 
h is imperfect
 
 
j
H
x
j
j
S
x
j
 
UsingClaim7.4andClaim7.5above,wehavethatforatleasta
 
 
 
p
 
 
  fraction of
x
 
D, this probability is at most
 
 
d
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f
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Thus,
k
B
 
B
 
k
 
 
 
 
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
 
 . We have
already observed that
k
A
 
 
A
k
 
 
 , and Sublemma 7.2 showed
that
k
B
 
 
A
 
k
 
 
 . Hence
k
A
 
B
k
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
 
 , and
the Hashing Lemma is established.
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Deﬁnition 6 (InteractiveProofs–IP)[GMR89]: Aninteractiveproof
system with completeness error
c
 
N
 
 
N and soundness error
s
 
N
 
 
Nfor a language
L is a two-party game, between a veri-
ﬁer executinga probabilisticpolynomial-time strategy(denoted
V )
andaproverwhichexecutesacomputationallyunboundedstrategy
(denoted
P), satisfying
  Completeness: For every
x
 
L, the veriﬁer
V rejects with
probabilityatmost
c
 
j
x
j
 ,afterinteractingwith theprover
P
on common input
x.
  Soundness: For every
x
 
 
L and every potential strategy
P
 , theveriﬁer
V acceptswith probabilityat most
s
 
j
x
j
 , af-
ter interacting with
P
  on common input
x.
In case
c
 
  we say that the interactive proof has perfect com-
pleteness.
Unless speciﬁeddifferently, an interactive proof system meansone
in which boththe completenessandsoundnesserrors are negligible
(i.e., eventually smaller than
 
 
p
 
 
 , for any polynomial
p). Recall
thatcompletenessandsoundnesserrorscanbedecreasedbyparallel
repetitions of the proof system. Thus, a proof system with sound-
ness and completenesserrors which sum-up to a function bounded
away from 1 (i.e.,
c
 
n
 
 
s
 
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
o
l
y
 
n
 ), can be trans-
formed into a proof system of the same number of rounds having
exponentially decreasingcompletenessand soundnesserrors. This
transformation preserveshonest-veriﬁerstatistical (resp., computa-
tional) zero-knowledge. (Recall that zero-knowledge with respect
to any veriﬁer is not preserved, in general, under parallel repetition
[GK96].)